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Kane Mary Kay
Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A
Procedural Compass
Mary Kay Kane*
Since the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act' is intended to pro-
vide a comprehensive scheme for actions against foreign sovereigns, it
deals with both substantive and procedural issues pertinent to those
suits. Substantively, the statute defines what entities may be treated
as foreign states.2 It also codifies the doctrine of "restrictive immu-
nity,"13 which recognizes immunity only for those acts that are public
in character,4 and sets forth criteria to distinguish public from pri-
* B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, University of Michigan. Professor of Law, University of Cali-
fornia, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2), (4), 1391(), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as the Act]. The Act went into effect on January 19, 1977.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1976). The Act specifically includes in its definition of a
foreign state the political subdivisions of foreign states and agencies or instrumentalities of
foreign states. Id § 1603(a). It then defines agency or instrumentality as any entity which is
a separate legal person, an organ of a foreign state, or whose major ownership interest is held
by a foreign state, and is not otherwise a citizen of the United States or created under the laws
of some third country. Id § 1603(b). These definitions put to rest some confusion that existed
under prior law concerning whether political subdivisions should be entitled to claim sover-
eign immunity and how to treat separate entities that were controlled by, or in some other
way closely related to, foreign governments. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 332, 339-42 (1969).
Unless otherwise indicated, throughout this article references to foreign states should be read
to include political subdivisions and agencies; I leave to other writers the task of defining
those terms further. See Kahale & Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of
Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 226-29 (1979).
3. In 1952 the State Department adopted the principle of restrictive sovereign immu-
nity. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Dep't of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
Operating under this principle until the enactment of the Act in 1976, courts allowed the
defending foreign state either to raise sovereign immunity as a defense in pending litigation or
to petition the State Department to rule that the acts involved were public in character and
therefore immune. The State Department then would make a formal suggestion of immunity
to the court which, in practice, was binding. For a discussion of the treatment of foreign
sovereign immunity prior to the Act, see Von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 39-43 (1978); Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 Giving the Plaintif His Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 543, 544-50 (1977). See
generally Annot., supra note 2.
4. Although the courts had been applying the restrictive immunity concept prior to
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vate acts.' Procedurally, it sets standards for both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction over foreign governments,6 establishes proce-
dures for service of process,7 and authorizes the execution of judg-
ments against foreign states.8
All the procedural standards derive from a single interlocking
standard for assessing the propriety of an action against a foreign
sovereign. The federal district courts have subject matter jurisdic-
tion9 whenever the defendant is a foreign state as defined in the Act'o
and does not fall within one of the Act's exceptions to immunity."
Personal jurisdiction1 2 exists whenever there is subject matter juris-
diction and proper service is made.'"
The guidance provided by the statute as to how this scheme
should operate is far from clear, as can be gathered from a simple
reading of the statute and as is proven by the ample confusion that
has attended judicial efforts to cope with this new creature in the
short five years it has been in effect. At least some of the confusion
may be explained by the approach taken in the statute itself."' The
Act blends into a purportedly single standard of "jurisdiction" both
1976, there was no agreement as to how to distinguish between acts that were public in char-
acter (jure imperfi), and so immune, and acts that were commercial (lure gestionis), for which
immunity was not available. Some courts looked to the nature of the transaction; some at-
tempted to determine the purpose of the activity; and some simply deferred unquestioningly
to the State Department's recommendations on the question. See Note, Sovereign Immunity of
States Engaged in Commercal Activities, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1086, 1095-98 (1965). See generaly
Annot., supra note 2. The Act adopts the "nature of the transaction" test, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)
(1976), resolving any doubts concerning what standard to use. But problems in applying that
standard still remain. See Von Mehren, supra note 3, at 52.
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605 (1976).
6. Id §§ 1330, 1332, 1441(d).
7. Id § 1608.
8. Id §§ 1609-1611.
9. Id § 1330(a).
10. Id § 1603(a).
11. Id §§ 1330(a), 1605-1607.
12. Id § 1330(b).
13. Id § 1608.
14; For example, § 1605(a)(1) ofthe Act provides for the judicial power ofeither federal
or state courts over claims against a foreign sovereign that has "waived its immunity either
explicitly or by implication." By blending into jurisdictional provisions unrelated concerns
involving immunity, the legislature appears to be authorizing the defendant state to consent
tojurisdiction. Yet it is familiar law that federal subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived
by a party's failure to object, and the court must inquire into jurisdiction sua sponte, even
when the parties expressly agree to litigate in federal court. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1393 (1969 & Supp. 1981). But it is only superfi-
cially true that jurisdiction under the Act seems to be conferred by agreement or by waiver.
The power of the court is created by the Act and the Act also expands the obligation of the
sovereign to submit to that power, but a residue of immunity still exists. An agreement not to
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substantive declarations about immunity and some quite varied
functional tests about procedural considerations for litigation. This
interdependence of concepts that we otherwise insist on keeping sepa-
rate and distinct has, predictably, caused problems that need never
have arisen.
Although it may seem artificial in light of the statutory approach
just described, the Act is best understood in a more traditional man-
ner, by considering the procedural aspects separately from questions
of immunity.' 5 While the reader may conclude that only Congress
can solve these problems-by rewriting the Act-this article will pro-
ceed on the premise that the congressional objectives must and can
be reached through the existing words of the statute. Turning
strange things into familiar ones makes it easier to recognize the legis-
lature's objectives--objectives that are clearly stated, even if the
means to achieve them are not. The goal of this inquiry is to provide
a procedural guide for suits properly brought under the statute,
rather than to decide which suits those should be.
Part I of the article examines the procedure for selecting the court
in which to file an action against a foreign entity, and discusses the
standards for determining subject matter jurisdiction, personal juris-
diction, and venue. Part II considers the special procedures applica-
ble in proceedings against foreign sovereigns,' 6 as well as the proper
manner in which to raise immunity objections under the statute-an
issue on which the statute is silent and about which there seems to be
some confusion. This Part also considers who bears the burden of
proving immunity and how that burden may be satisfied. Finally,
this Part explores whether a jury trial may be demanded in an action
against a foreign government, despite statutory language to the
contrary.
raise immunity claims merely reduces the residue still further. See Reale Int'l, Inc. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1981).
15. See, e.g., Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1062 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
("[Tihe Immunities Act incorporates in the same provisions answers to three issues: (t) when
to grant immunity. . . ; (2) what is the basis for long-arm in personam jurisdiction . ;
and (3) how great is the scope of subject matter jurisdiction. The effect of this construction is
to conceal distinctions that need to be drawn in careful analysis.").
16. This inquiry will not entail any study of the postjudgment attachment and execu-
tion provisions of the statute. Although they are clearly important and may produce many
interesting problems and questions, this article focuses on the procedural rules governing ac-
tions against foreign sovereigns until a judgment is obtained. Postjudgment remedies are left
for later explorations. For the views of other commentators on this subject, see Del Bianco,
Execution and Attachment Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 5 YALE STUD. WORLD
PUB. ORD. 109 (1978); Von Mehren, supra note 3.
January 1982]
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I. SELECTING A PROPER COURT
As in all civil litigation, the first concern when filing a lawsuit
against a foreign sovereign is determining which courts have subject
matter and personal jurisdiction and venue.
A. Subject Matter Juisdiclion
The Act grants original jurisdiction to the federal district courts
in any nonjury"7 civil action against a foreign state that is not enti-
tled to immunity. 8 The jurisdiction of the federal district courts is
concurrent with that of the state courts, 9 although the foreign state
is entitled to remove the action to the federal court if it so desires.20
Although these provisions appear relatively straightforward, they
raise several interesting questions. First, may alien plaintiffs sue for-
eign states under the Act? Second, is the Act intended to provide the
exclusive basis for jurisdiction in suits against foreign sovereigns?
Third, what procedures control removal? This section considers each
of these issues.
1. Suits by alien plaintzf.
The Act confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over actions
against a foreign state without reference to 'the plaintiff's citizen-
17. On jury trial in an action against a foreign sovereign, see text accompanying notes
187-201 infa.
18. Prior to 1976, federal subject matter jurisdiction in actions against foreign sover-
eigns rested on the diversity statute, which provided for jurisdiction in actions involving more
than $10,000 that were between "citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976). Congress recognized that this jurisdictional base was
superfluous when it added § 1330, and thus it amended § 1332(a)(2) to refer only to actions
between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state." See H.R. REP. No.
1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprintedin [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6613
[hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. The Act also amended the diversity statute to provide
for federal subject matter jurisdiction in suits involving more than $10,000 that were brought
by foreign sovereigns against "citizens of a State or of different States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(4) (1976). Other sections of the Act specify the definition of foreign state and the
scope of immunity. Id §§ 1603(a)-(b), 1604-1607.
19. The legislative history contains no clear statement why Congress decided to provide
for concurrent rather than exclusive federal court jurisdiction. Congress appears to have as-
sumed that most cases would be filed in federal courts and therefore sought to afford easy
access to them. Perhaps because litigants could file suit against foreign states in state or
federal court prior to the Act, Congress saw no reason to alter that practice inasmuch as
removal could allay fears of local prejudice or nonuniform standards. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (d)
(1976); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 13, repinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6604, 6611.
20. For a discussion of removal, see text accompanying notes 48-62 infta.
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ship. 2' Taken literally, this would authorize suits by alien plaintiffs
in federal court. But allowing such suits would in some ways be a
departure from past practice.22 The general diversity statute does
not provide for actions between aliens,23 and the judicial power
clause of the Constitution24 makes no reference to actions solely be-
tween citizens of foreign states.25
Interpreting the Act to confer federal jurisdiction over these ac-
tions has been challenged on two grounds. The first is that the Act
was not intended to afford a federal forum for the claims of aliens.26
The second challenge is that federal jurisdiction over actions brought
by aliens against foreign states is not authorized by article III of the
Constitution, and is therefore beyond the power of Congress to
confer.27
The evidence of congressional intent on the first question is incon-
clusive. The Act's own declaration of purpose refers to protecting
"both foreign states and litigants" in United States courts,28 and the
House Report on the bill expresses a desire to provide guidelines for
"cparties" maintaining a lawsuit against a foreign state.29 But no-
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
22. A Second Circuit decision in which suit was filed premised on diversity prior to the
effective date of the Act suggested this problem, but avoided resolving it. When the defend-
ant challenged on the ground that both the plaintiff, a Venezuelan governmental entity, and
one of the defendants, a Swiss corporation, were aliens, the plaintiff argued that the court
should apply the Act retroactively to confer jurisdiction. The court rejected this argument
since it found no congressional intent to affect pending lawsuits. Corporacion Venezolana de
Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 863 (1981).
23. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 24, at 93 (3d ed. 1976).
24. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
25. See Hodgson & Thompson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809).
26. One might argue that United States courts should not be clogged with disputes
between foreign parties in which the courts have no interest, and that they should not provide
a forum for alien plaintiffs who could not sue in their own courts. This concern, though
facially valid, is not compelling. To come within one of the exceptions to immunity listed in
the statute, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1607 (1976), the transaction on which the suit is based
necessarily will have had some connection with the United States, so that it is unlikely that
totally foreign disputes will clog our courts. And, to the extent that a suit has only a tenuous
connection with the United States, the court may invoke the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens to dismiss the action, thereby further protecting itself from unwanted litigation. See
text accompanying notes 134-42 infia.
27. Congressional authority for providing jurisdiction in suits against foreign sovereigns
might be found in article I. Under the powers granted therein, Congress can regulate com-
merce with foreign nations, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and may define offenses against the
"Law of Nations," id, cl. 10. As part of the exercise of those powers, Congress might grant
the federal courts article I jurisdiction to hear cases under the Act.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
29. HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 6, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD.
NEWS 6604, 6604.
January 1982]
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where is there any indication that the Congress specifically consid-
ered whether the new jurisdiction statute would be available to
foreign plaintiffs. Most likely, the question simply was not raised.
While the legislative history may be confusing,3" the statute itself is
quite clear. It grants federal jurisdiction for actions against foreign
entities regardless of the identity of the plaintiff and provides for the
removal of suits brought against foreign states in state courts.31
Thus, although allowing foreign plaintiffs to sue other than in
tort departs from prior practice, the unequivocal wording of the'Act,
plus the absence of legislative history suggesting any limit on the na-
tionality of.parties'able to beniefit from the Act, seem t6 make them
eligible. Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigir'a, the only case on
point, so held.3
The constitutional issue raised by allowing alien plaintiffs to sue
is whether these are cases "arising under. . . the Laws of the United
States. '33 The argument supporting jurisdiction on this clause may
be based on two different premises. The first is that the statute pro-
vides some substantive rules of decision or attempts in some way to
regulate conduct, and thus suits invoking the Act necessarily meet
the "arising under" criteria. The second argument is that there is a
sufficient national or federal interest in cases against foreign sover-
eigns to compel use of a federal rule of decision rather than state law.
The Second Circuit recently addressed both of these questions
and ruled that jurisdiction could not be asserted constitutionally.
3 4
The court's conclusion that there was not a sufficient federal interest
simply because of an asserted need for a uniform standard under
30. SeeJurisdiction of U.S Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Heaings on HR. 11315Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on theJudiciay,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hear-
ings]; see also id at 31 (statement of Bruno Ristau).
31. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d) (1976).
32. 647 F.2d 320, 324 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980) (allowing a suit by an alien plaintiff against a foreign government under the Alien
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976)); Comment, Torture as a Tort in Violation of International
Law.: Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 33 STAN. L. REv. 353 (1981).
33. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1981) authorizes general
federal question jurisdiction in all suits "arising under the . . . laws . . . of the United
States," but that provision has been limited to actions in which a well-pleaded complaint
reveals the federal question to be decided. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149 (1908). The Act's sovereign immunity question presents a clear federal issue, but
one raised properly by defense, not on the face of the complaint. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 326-27 (2d Cir. 1981). Thus, the question presented is
whether the "arising under" language in U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 is sufficiently broader than
the statute to allow these suits to be brought.
34. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
Vol. 34:385
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which foreign states might be sued3 5 seems sound, although a suffi-
cient federal interest might be found depending on the underlying
facts in a given case. 6 However, its conclusion that the Act does not
provide any substantive rules of decision is unduly narrow.
Any federal complaint must invoke section 1606 of the Act, which
defines the extent of liability of a foreign state. That section declares
that the foreign state is liable to "the same extent as a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances," but qualifies the principle by pre-
cluding the recovery of punitive damages and by substituting a
compensatory remedy for wrongful death if the law of the place
where the action or omission occurred employs a punitive measure-
ment. 37 Suits against foreign sovereigns now, if not before, arise
under federal law because the Act establishes a liability standard for
them. That standard incorporates the law of the place where the "ac-
tion or omission" occurred, and applies certain modifications to it.
In cases against foreign governments in state courts, the state court
would be obliged, like the federal court, to resort to the Act to deter-
mine the liability standard to be applied in suits against foreign
states.38
2. Jurisdiction based outside of section 1330.
The question whether Congress intended section 1330 to provide
the only proper jurisdictional base for suits against foreign govern-
ments is important because section 1330 contains procedural restric-
tions that do not normally apply to other civil actions in the federal
courts. It allows jurisdiction only for nonjury actions,3 9 and author-
izes only in personam jurisdiction, precluding the prejudgment at-
tachment of defendant's property.4°
Litigants already have tried to assert alternate bases for jurisdic-
tion, alleging jurisdiction based on the diversity statute as suits be-
35. Id. at 329.
36. See, e.g., Mashayekhi v. Iran, 515 F. Supp. 41 (D.D.C. 1981) (Iranian seeking com-
pensation from Iran and Iranian national radio and television for work done in United
States).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976).
38. Deliberate adoption of state law (whether foreign or domestic) is just as much a
"law of the United States" as is substitution of a congressionally preferred damages standard.
This is unlike the principles prevailing in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), where
state law controlled because Congress could not act, or had not acted. Here both the liability
and damages rules are those that Congress deliberately specified.
39. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d) (1976); text accompanying notes 187-201 infra.
40. See text accompanying notes 116-26 infra.
January 1982]
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tween "citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state,"4
or under the general federal question statute, as for example, an ac-
tion by a longshoreman seeking damages under the federal long-
shoremen's compensation act from a foreign government for injuries
sustained when aboard a ship owned by that government.42 In each
of these instances the litigants clearly met the standards in the alter-
nate jurisdictional statutes.43
The courts disagree as to whether section 1330 was intended to be
the exclusive source of jurisdiction for cases brought under the Act.
Those finding exclusivity argue that Congress meant the procedures
set forth in the statute to govern in all suits against foreign sovereigns
and that it therefore is necessary to limit jurisdiction to section
1330. 4 4 Courts that have allowed suits outside section 1330 have de-
clined to preclude jurisdiction in the absence of a more explicit com-
mand from Congress.45
The decisions of courts on both sides of the issue reveal the confu-
sion that arises from the blend of substantive and procedural criteria
in the Act.4' Even if Congress intended to specify the exclusive pro-
cedures to be used in suits against foreign governments, section 1330
need not provide the sole basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction address the issue of whether
the federal court is competent to handle certain controversies.
Which procedures must be used in actions against foreign sovereigns
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976) (amended 1976, see note 18 supra); see, e.g., Geveke &
Co. Int'l v. Kompania di Awa i Elektrisidat di Korsou N.V., 482 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (refusing to grant jurisdiction outside of the Act).
42. The federal question statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1981), thus might be
applied to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-950 (1976); see, e.g., Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
43. In other types of litigation in which more than one jurisdictional statute may be
applicable, the plaintiff may choose which statute to invoke, thereby avoiding some require-
ments. For example, compare interpleader actions under FED. R. Civ. P. 22 with statutory
interpleader actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976). See C. WRIGHT, supra note 23, § 74.
44. For decisions finding § 1330 to be the exclusive means of obtaining federal subject
matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns, see, e.g., Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de
Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981); Jones v. Shipping Corp. of
India, 491 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Va. 1980); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 489 F. Supp.
526 (E.D. Va. 1980); Geveke & Co. Int'l v. Kompania di Awa i Elektrisidat di Korsou N.V.,
482 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
45. For decisions allowing jurisdiction to be based outside of§ 1330, see, e.g., Rex v. Cia.
Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Houston v. Murmansk Shipping
Co., 87 F.R.D. 71 (D. Md. 1980); Lonon v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Basileiro, 85
F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979).
46. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 34:385
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is a separate problem; it does not speak to the federal courts' compe-
tence to decide these actions. Thus, a plaintiff suing a foreign gov-
ernment may attempt to claim federal jurisdiction under any
statutory base for which the requirements are met. Whether the pro-
cedures applicable to that suit are limited to those set forth in the Act
depends on whether they were meant to be exclusive; if so, they
should apply regardless of the jurisdictional base of the lawsuit.
Defining the problem as one concerning whether exclusive proce-
dures were intended may lead to the same conclusion as when the
problem is treated as an exclusive jurisdiction problem. Nonetheless,
the process by which that conclusion is reached will be much more
straightforward, with less likelihood of confused or erroneous rulings
resulting from a misplaced reliance on jurisdictional considerations.47
In addition, identifying the question as one concerning the applica-
bility of procedures eliminates one more preliminary inquiry in suits
against foreign governments: Courts may postpone decisions regard-
ing the exclusivity of certain procedures until the applicability of a
given procedure is questioned.
3. Removaljurisdiction.
A foreign state defendant not wanting to submit to the jurisdic-
tion of a state court has an unqualified right to remove such an ac-
tion to the federal district court in the district and division where the
state action is pending.48 Two issues involving the Act's removal pro-
visions have arisen. First, there is the question of whether the statute
authorizes the removal of claims against nonstate co-defendants in
the suit.4 9 Second, there has been some question concerning the tim-
ing restrictions that apply to removal by foreign sovereigns.
The foreign state defendant in a multiparty suit clearly may re-
47. For an example of the confused and complex reasoning that comes from treating the
question ofjury trial rights as dependent on the statutory basis for jurisdiction, see Rex v. Cia.
Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976). The sole criterion for removal is that the court must
find that the defendant is a foreign state under the Act. See note 2 supra.
49. Notably, if 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976) were construed to preclude removal of the
entire action by the foreign state defendant, removal might be accomplished under id.
§ 1441 (c), which authorizes removal "[w]henever a separate and independent claim or cause
of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise
non-removable claims or causes of action." But removal would be less certain than under
§ 1441(d) because it would depend on finding that the additional claims not against the for-
eign state were "separate and independent" and would allow the court to remand the other
claims to state court.
January 1982]
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move the entire action,5" and the court can retain jurisdiction over
the claims of foreign nonstate defendants even if those claims could
not have been brought independently in the federal courts. This
conclusion is derived, first, from the power of Congress to authorize
jurisdiction based on only minimal diversity,5 ' and second, from the
broad scope of the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitu-
tion,52 which allows Congress to provide for jurisdiction beyond the
strict limits of article III.13 In the Act, Congress not only attempted
to avoid the fragmentation of litigation' but also made law poten-
tially affecting relations with foreign governments-man issue clearly
within its constitutional .domain. In addition, one court has sug-
gested that allowing removal of the entire action woutld be constitu-
tional as long as pendent jurisdiction could properly be asserted over
the additional claims and parties.54
50. Focusing on the language of the Act, the court in Arango v. Guzman Travel Advi-
sors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1376 (5th Cir. 1980), noted that the Act referred to the removal of
"[a]ny civil action," 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976), not the removal of claims, and that courts
had interpreted similar language in a statute authorizing removal by federal officers sued in
state courts, id § 1442(a)(1), to include all the claims then pending. Further, the legislative
history suggests that Congress wanted to give foreign states clear authority to remove regard-
less of the presence of multiple defendants, 621 F.2d at 1375, even when some of the defend-
ants might prefer to remain in state court. Congress preferred this result "[i]n view of the
potential sensitivity of actions against foreign states and the importance of developing a uni-
form body oflaw in this area." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 32, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6631. General notions of judicial economy also support
removal of the other claims in order to avoid repetitive or multiple lawsuits in the state and
federal courts.
51. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (1976) (interpleader).
52. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
53. This question arose involving the more general removal provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c) (1976), which authorizes removal of an entire action when the court finds that a
separate and independent claim "which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined
with one or more otherwise non-removable claims." A party challenged that provision on the
ground that it effectively allowed suits in the federal courts that did not meet the complete
diversity requirement. See Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). The court based its decision upholding the statute on the powers noted in
text accompanying notes 51-52 supra. This same rationale would uphold the constitutionality
of§ 1441(d).
54. Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1377 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980).
If this pendent jurisdiction analysis were to apply generally, the only limitations on the re-
moval of claims against additional defendants would be the considerations whether all the
claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact, whether it will be judicially economi-
cal to try all the claims together, and whether Congress "has addressed itself to thepar as to
whom jurisdiction pendent to the principal claim is sought." Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1,
16 (1976) (emphasis in original). The Arango court found that Congress intended to allow the
removal of pendent parties. 621 F.2d at 1377. Since in most cases in which the plaintiff is
suing multiple defendants, the claims, though separate, all will arise out of a single transac-
tion or series of related occurrences, FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a), this standard easily should be
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Removal is governed by the same procedures that apply to other
actions,5 5 except with respect to the time the foreign state has to re-
move the action or waive its rights of removal. Normally, a defend-
ant loses the right to remove if the petition is not filed within thirty
days after receipt of the summons or complaint.5 7 The removal pro-
vision in the Act, however, specifically allows the time limitation to
be enlarged "at any time for cause shown.
58
Although a "for cause shown" standard may seem quite vague,
the phrase takes substantial content from other contexts. For exam-
ple, a defendant may move to. set aside the entry of a. default "for
good cause shown."5 9 In that context, four elemefits support a show-
ing of good cause: (1) there is some excuse for allowing the default;
(2) a meritorious defense to the action exists; (3) the plhintiff will
not be seriously prejudiced if the default is set aside; and (4) ihe mo-
tion was made promptly upon learning of the default entry. 60 Al-
though not all of these concerns are relevant to a late attempt to
remove, 6 1 the above list suggests that courts will weigh the reasons for
the delay against the potential prejudice to the plaintiff if removal is
allowed. An additional important factor affecting this balancing
process is the expressed desire of Congress to allow removal freely in
order to assure foreign states access to a federal forum.
62
satisfied. Thus, as a practical matter no serious barrier to the removal of the entire action
exists under either analysis.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1976).
56. Although the removal provision does not speak to the question of what, if any, acts
on the part of the defendant in the state court proceeding constitute a waiver of rights of
removal, it is quite clear that waiver will occur only if the foreign state fails to move in a
timely fashion and cannot show adequate cause to enlarge the normal period. It is well estab-
lished in other removal contexts that the defendant's conduct prior to removal cannot be used
to establish waiver: The right to remove is absolute as long as a timely motion is filed. See 14
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3732, at 731
(1976). And since Congress, by allowing the extension of time limits, treats foreign state de-
fendants even more generously than it does other defendants, it seems inconceivable that the
former would have implicitly waived that right by some other conduct. Indeed, some author-
ities have argued that the absence of any provision in the Act stipulating how and when to
waive the right to remove should be taken as precluding the waiver of those rights even by
contract. See id § 3729, at 170-71 (Supp. 1980).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1976).
58. Id § 1441(d).
59. FED. R. CIv. P. 55(c).
60. See 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 2692, at 301-02 (1973).
61. Whether the foreign state has a meritorious defense to the action seems irrelevant to
the question whether the action may be tried in federal, rather than state court.
62. See note 50 supra. The only reported case applying the "for cause shown" standard
in the removal statute seems to support the above analysis. Gray v. Permanent Mission of
People's Republic of Congo to United Nations, 443 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), af'dmem.,
January 19821
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Thus, a foreign state should be able to invoke removal jurisdic-
tion for any action, even if other nongovernmental defendants also
are present. Further, a court should not impose rigid time con-
straints on a foreign state desiring to remove, as long as there is good
cause for the delay. Rather, the court should base its disposition of
an untimely petition to remove on a balance of the interests of the
parties and the policy of the Act to provide easy access to the federal
courts for foreign government defendants.
B. Persona/Jurisdiction
To American lawyers and judges, whether the Republic of France
can be sued is very different from the question of where France may
be sued. We answer the first inquiry by examining whether France
enjoys immunity in American courts. We answer the second by ask-
ing whether France has engaged in acts or conduct which warrant
summoning it before the courts of some jurisdiction.
But does that latter question even exist under the Act? No court
has found any intrinsic limit on the worldwide service of process by
federal courts if congressional intent on this point is clear. Under this
approach, compliance with the statute's service provision alone could
suffice to establish personal jurisdiction.63
Although the Act does not explicitly consider the propriety of this
approach, both its legislative history64 and the uniform holding of the
580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978). The court allowed removal even though the action was seven
months old and judgment had been entered. Id at 819. The cause shown to support al-
lowing this untimely removal was that the defendant never had received proper service of the
original complaint, and thus lacked adequate notice of the proceedings in order to remove
earlier. For a discussion of proper methods of service of process, see text accompanying notes
68-93 nt fra.
63. The reason the courts must find that the application of personal jurisdiction does
not violate the due process clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, is that only judgments obtained in
keeping with it will be fully enforceable throughout the United States under the full faith and
credit clause, id art. IV, § 1. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 728, 732-33 (1878). If a
judgment against a foreign sovereign must be enforced outside the United States, then only
notions of comity control. See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 46 (1959). Many civil
law countries have authorized personal jurisdiction on bases far less compelling than mini-
mum contacts, allowing jurisdiction solely because of the nationality of the plaintiff or pres-
ence of the defendant, although these more extravagant forms ofjurisdiction also seem to be
disappearing. See Riesenfeld, ShatJer v. Heitner Hoding, Implications, Forebodi'ngs, 30 HASTINGS
LJ. 1183, 1201-02 (1979). Nonetheless, at least insofar as personal jurisdiction concerns are
centered on the need to render an enforceable judgment, a United States judgment entered
against a defendant who lacks the requisite minimum contacts with the United States may
still be enforceable abroad as a perfectly proper judgment.
64. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 13, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6604, 6612 ("Significantly, each of the immunity provisions in the bill, sections
[Vol. 34:385
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decisions thus far65 prevent this conclusion. Thus, when filing suit
against a foreign government it is necessary to consider not only
whether the service requirements are met, but also whether the asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction would be consistent with the constitu-
tional due process standard set out in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington 6 6 -that the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum so that notions of fair play and substantial justice
would not be offended if jurisdiction were asserted.67
The Act does depart from traditional precepts of personal juris-
diction, however, in its treatment of quasi in rem jurisdiction and
prejudgment attachments. This section will conclude with a discus-
sion of those provisions.
1. Service ofprocess.
As indicated earlier, the Act authorizes personal jurisdiction only
when proper service has been made under the statute.68 Thus, any
discussion of personal jurisdiction should take into account the avail-
able methods for serving process on the defendant.
Procedures for service offprocess. The service of process provisions ap-
plicable to foreign states and their instrumentalities are set out in the
1605-1607, requires some connection between the lawsuit and the United States. . . .These
immunity provisions, therefore, prescribe the necessary contacts which must exist before our
courts can exercise personal jurisdiction."); see also 1976 Hearings, supra note 30, at 31 (state-
ment of Bruno Ristau).
65. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d
Cir. 1981); Thomas P. Gonzales Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614
F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F.
Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), afd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981); Waukesha Engine Div.,
Dresser Americas, Inc. v. Banco Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo, 485 F. Supp. 490 (E.D.
Wis. 1980); Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); East Eu-
rope Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y.), afdmem., 610 F.2d 806
(2d Cir. 1979); Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), afdmm., 607 F.2d
494 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afdper
curiam, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448
F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aj'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Carl, Suing Foreign
Governments in American Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33
Sw. L.J. 1009 (1979).
66. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
67. Id at 316. Several subsequent Supreme Court decisions have interpreted and ex-
panded upon the International Shoe standard. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320
(1980).
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1976).
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Act and fill a previous vacuum in the law.69 The service provisions
are divided into two parts, one for service on foreign states them-
selves, the other for service on the agencies or instrumentalities of
foreign states. All provisions are designed to result in the most effec-
tive notice possible, given the peculiar problems of dealing with de-
fendants from different cultures who may or may not be fluent in
English. If service is not accomplished as provided under the statute,
then personal jurisdiction is lacking and the suit must be dismissed.
70
The statute sets out a hierarchy of four methods of service on
foreign state defendants. The favored method is to comply with any
special arrangements for service that exist between the plaintiff and
the foreign state. 7' This provision should encourage parties con-
tracting with foreign states to agree on service procedures in order to
avoid later problems. 2 Absent such an agreement, the plaintiff
should serve the summons and complaint in accordance with any
international convention on the service of judicial documents to
which both the United States and the defendant state are signato-
ries.73 If no convention applies, the plaintiff may have the clerk of
the court mail a copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of
the suit, in English and translated into the official language of the
foreign state, to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the de-
69. Id. § 1608. Prior to 1976, there was no specific authorization in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or in state statutes for service on foreign governments. See Miller, Service of,
Process on State, Local and Foreign Governments Under Rule 4, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Some
Unfinished Businessfor the Rulemakers, 46 F.R.D. 101, 121-39 (1969) (discussion of service prac-
tices prior to the Act). Courts strained to apply existing service provisions to foreign govern-
ment defendants, and some courts ruled that they could develop ad hoc procedures to fill the
void as long as due process concerns were met. Because of the absence of any clearly applica-
ble service provisions, actions commonly were begun by the attachment of the foreign state's
property. See, e.g., Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Trans-
portes, 336 F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); National Am. Corp.
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), a'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d
Cir. 1979); Note, Sovereign Immunity-Limits ofJudikzl Control, 18 HARV. INT'I L.J. 429, 443
(1977).
70. See, e.g., 40 D 6262 Realty Corp. v. United Arab Emirates Gov't, 447 F. Supp. 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Gray v. Permanent Mission of People's Republic of Congo, 443 F. Supp. 816
(S.D.N.Y.), afdmem., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1) (1976).
72. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 24, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6604, 6623.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(2) (1976). The only service convention to which the United
States presently is a party is the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-
judicial Documents, done Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638. This method of
service is available only in actions against other signatory states. For a current listing of
adhering nations, see the latest edition of the annual Department of State publication Treaties
in Force, or the annotations to FED. R. Civ. P. 4 in 28 U.S.C.A. (West 1960 & Supp. 1981).
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fendant foreign state. A signed receipt for this mailing must be pro-
cured from the defendant.74 Only if the plaintiff cannot accomplish
the mail service just described within thirty days may diplomatic
means be used.75 This last method requires the clerk to send all the
aforementioned documents and translations to the office of the Secre-
tary of State to be transmitted through diplomatic channels. 6
The statutory provisions governing service on agencies or instru-
mentalities of foreign states reveal a similar hierarchical approach,
favoring service in accordance with special arrangements or applica-
ble international conventions.77 However, depending on the charac-
ter of the defendant instrumentality, additional service methods are
permissible. Treating the foreign instrumentalities like private cor-
porations, the plaintiff may serve process on any officer, managing or
general agent, or agent authorized to receive process in the United
States. 78 As a last resort, service of the summons and complaint, ac-
companied by appropriate translations, may be made in accordance
with procedures designated by an authority of the foreign state in
response to a letter rogatory, by mail to the instrumentality with a
signed receipt required, or as directed by the court as long as the
method is consistent with the law of the place where service is
made. 79 Thus, although the methods provided are in some ways less
rigid than those governing suits against foreign states, the emphasis
on assuring notice by adequate service also characterizes these
procedures.8 °
The fact that few problems have arisen to date in the application
74. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) (1976).
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) (4) (1976); HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 24, reprinted in
[1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 6604, 6623.
76. Congress took great care in framing these provisions to assure actual notice to the
foreign state. If the plaintiff uses mailed notice or diplomatic channels, the statute mandates
that the plaintiff transmit a "notice of suit" in addition to the translations of the summons
and complaint. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608(a)(3)-(4) (1976). The contents of the notice are prescribed
by regulations promulgated by the Secretary of State. 22 C.F.R. §§ 93.1-.2 (1980). Those
require the plaintiff to describe the action and relief requested and to explain in "simplified
language" the obligation to answer or to suffer a default. The notice also must include a copy
of the Act.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(1)-(2) (1976).
78. Id § 1608(b)(2). This list of persons authorized to receive process for the instrumen-
tality of a foreign state is nearly identical to the list of persons authorized to receive federal
process on behalf of corporate defendants. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(3) (1976). This provision essentially incorporates the methods
for service in a foreign country that already are part of the federal rules. See FED. R. Civ. P.
4(i).
80. One difference of particular note is that a plaintiff serving an agency or instrumen-
tality need not include with the summons and complaint and translations any notice of suit.
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of these requirements attests to their value. Still, interpretative diffi-
culties may arise. For example, plaintiffs must be able to determine
whether the defendants they are suing are "foreign states" or "instru-
mentalities" in order to decide which method of process to use."' If
the defendant is an instrumentality, plaintiffs then must determine
who qualifies as the agent for service purposes."2 Further, if the court
must design special service procedures for a given action against a
foreign state agency or instrumentality, it must undertake the task of
determining foreign law because of the need to make certain that the
method chosen comports with the law of the country where service is
made.83 But these problems seem relatively minor, and further expe-
rience under the Act should resolve most ambiguities.8 4
Exclusivity of section 1608 service ofprocess. It is not clear from the
text of the Act whether a court can authorize service of process by
means other than those listed in the Act unless it finds that the statu-
tory methods are unworkable. For example, if a suit is filed in state
court, can the plaintiff use applicable state service procedures rather
than federal law?8"
The legislative history of the Act and the policies underlying it
compel the conclusion that its service procedures are meant to be
exclusive. 6 Because Congress was concerned with establishing meth-
ods of service that would be effective in notifying the defendant state,
the Act requires plaintiffs to use the means most likely to provide
adequate notice before turning to less secure methods. To allow a
See note 76 supra. The legislative history contains no explanation for the elimination of the
notice of suit requirement in actions against foreign instrumentalities.
81. See, e.g., Gray v. Permanent Mission of People's Republic of Congo, 443 F. Supp.
816, 820 (S.D.N.Y.), afdmem., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978).
82. See id at 820 n.4. Since the persons designated in the statute are the same as those
in FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3), some guidance on this question can be found in authorities inter-
preting the federal rule. Seegenerallv 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, §§ 1100-1104.
83. In New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission
Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 78-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the court found that it. was not possible to
obtain a definitive statement regarding Iranian law governing permissible service methods
and thus ruled that the method used did not need to be identical to the law of the foreign
state, so long as it was not prohibited under that law.
84. A court may refer to cases interpreting and applying FED. R. CIv. P. 4(i) for gui-
dance in applying the procedures set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(3) (1976). See 4 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 14, §§ 1133-1136.
85. As a practical matter, the potential for applying alternative service procedures
should occur only when suit is filed in state court since the Act provides the exclusive means
of service of process in the federal courts. See text accompanying note 86 infra.
86. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 23-24, rep)ined tn [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6604, 6622-23.
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plaintiff to circumvent this entire scheme merely by filing suit in a
state court and invoking its procedures appears to be inconsistent
with the Act's goal of promoting the uniform treatment of actions
against foreign sovereigns. The conclusion that federal law governs
may require the states to follow procedures uncommon to their judi-
cial systems and may, in some sense, represent a serious burden on
the state courts. Nonetheless, this result is justified by the federal
government's need to control relations with foreign governments.
Although the exclusivity of the service provisions in the Act seems
necessary in the face of competing state procedures, courts may have
the power to create an ad hoc approach to service when the statutory
requirements cannot be satisfied in actions against foreign states. In
suits against foreign agencies or instrumentalities, the Act authorizes
the court to create a service procedure when other methods are un-
available."7 The absence of a catch-all provision in the section deal-
ing with foreign states may suggest that Congress did not want to
confer that authority on the courts. But is is more likely that the
omission was a drafting oversight occurring because Congress never
considered that a situation would arise in which service could not be
made through diplomatic channels. This country's difficulties with
Iran since 1979 have resulted in just such a situation.
In New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co. ,8 the plaintiffs sued in the federal district court for
wrongs arising from Iran's policy of nationalization and its repudia-
tions of executory contracts. Attempts to serve process on Iran under
the Act were futile. The court refused to adopt the defendant's the-
ory that congressional silence constituted a total prohibition of alter-
native means for service of process. 9 Instead, it held that Rule 4(i),9°
which provides procedures for service in a foreign country, may sup-
plement the statutory methods and that the Rule authorizes the fed-
eral courts to fashion an appropriate procedure.' The court ordered
service by Telex in Farsi and English to the defendants stating the
text of the summons, the notice of suit, and notice that the pleadings
were being mailed under separate cover. Further, the court ordered
the pleadings to be served on all counsel who had filed a notice of
appearance on behalf of any of the defendants.2 While the ad hoc
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(3)(C) (1976).
88. 495 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
89. Id at 79.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
91. 495 F. Supp. at 80 n.2.
92. Id at 81.
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power used by the court in New England Merchants should be limited
to those extraordinary situations in which none of the statutory pro-
cedures work, the authority of the court to act in those situations
seems justified. The only concern must be to devise the method most
likely actually to notify the defendant state.
93
2. Satisfving the International Shoe standard94
Personal jurisdiction and immunity. Many of the cases arising under
the Act reveal a marked confusion in their application of the mini-
mum contacts doctrine. This confusion results from the Act's blend
of procedural and substantive criteria into a single, unified standard
and from the failure of the courts to understand how to apply tradi-
tional jurisdiction doctrines within this unique framework. 5
Personal jurisdiction requires sufficient contacts of the defendant
with the forum to assure fairness to a nonresident defending away
from home. The substantive law of sovereign immunity involves
considerations of whether a state has acted outside its official capac-
ity so that it is possible to provide a remedy for an injured plaintiff
without abandoning the general respect given to foreign
governments.
A decision that sovereign immunity should not be upheld does
93. Only one method that would seem likely to be effective is expressly precluded in the
legislative history of the Act: Service may not be accomplished by mailing process to the
state's embassy. Congress wanted to preclude service on an embassy by mail in order to avoid
problems that might arise concerning possible violations of the Vienna Convention on Diplo-
matic Relations, openedfor szgnature Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. See
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 26, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6604, 6625.
94. One must be aware when discussing the International Shoe standard that the Supreme
Court case names are slightly misleading. The Act deals with matters truly international and
world-wide in scope. International Shoe was not international at all-the defendant was a
Missouri corporation; World-Wide Volkswagen involved an American subsidiary of a foreign
concern doing business in New York. The exclusive subject of Supreme Court adjudication in
this area has been making geographic allocation within the United States itself, not
determining the reach of American process, state or federal, beyond the national boundaries.
It is this latter question which now occupies us. The problems probably are similar--due
process concerns apply to all parties in American courts-but we should be conscious that
they are not identical.
95. See, e.g., Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981,
982 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (personal jurisdiction raised sua sponte since related to immunity,
which is tied to subject matter jurisdiction, which is never waived); see also notes 14-15 supra.
Unfortunately, the American Law Institute has not taken the opportunity in its revision of
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States to clarify these jurisdiction issues, but
has accepted the statute's blended immunity-jurisdiction approach uncritically. See RE-
STATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REvISED) § 453, com-
ment c, at 184 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
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not mean, therefore, that the tribunal in which suit is filed is a fair
one in due process terms. In contrast, the defendant state may have
such extensive contacts with the United States that the minimum
contacts standard clearly would support the assertion of personal ju-
risdiction, but the activity on which the suit is filed may not be suffi-
ciently commercial to fall within an exception to immunity. Despite
these underlying differences, several courts have assumed that the
immunity sections serve essentially as the long-arm provisions of the
Act and that it is those sections that must be construed in light of
International Shoe.96 Other courts have gone further and have at-
tempted to construe those immunity provisions not only in light of
minimum contacts, but also in keeping with the interpretation of
similar language in their own jurisdictions' long-arm statutes.97
The decision as to what law and policies should be consulted
when deciding to assert jurisdiction against a foreign sovereign is crit-
ical. As the legislative history makes clear, the Act should promote a
uniform body of law so that foreign state defendants, as well as pri-
vate plaintiffs, can predict their exposure to suit and act accord-
ingly.9 Yet, construction of the statute to date is far from uniform.
Further, it is not clear that the Act, as applied, adequately advances
the goals underlying the restrictive immunity approach.99
Keeping separate the jurisdiction and immunity questions, at
least for purposes of analysis, allows a coherent approach to each is-
96. See Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281, 1286-87 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), afdon
other grounds, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097,
1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affdper curiam, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
97. See Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica,
614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980); Waukesha Engine Div., Dresser Americas, Inc. v. Banco Na-
cional de Fomento Cooperativo, 485 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Wis. 1980); East Europe Domestic
Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (referring to the District of
Columbia long-arm statute), afdmem., 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979); Upton v. Empire of Iran,
459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), afdmem., 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
98. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 12-13, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6604, 6611. The United States then could avoid disputes with foreign nations
caused by disparate treatment of foreign nations in the courts.
99. Judge Weinstein explained, "The insuperable problem faced by the plaintiff arises
because of the Immunities Act's policy and its conflation of the doctrines of subject matter
jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction and sovereign immunity. Despite the rule that
'[s]overeign immunity is a derogation from the normal exercise of jurisdiction by the courts
and should be accorded only in clear cases,'. . . Congress has given the courts little room to
maneuver in a case such as the one now before us." Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F.
Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (citation omitted).
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sue. 00 Moreover, increased clarity of analysis and uniformity in de-
cision would result if the courts would interpret the statutory
provisions in light of the policies underlying the doctrine of sovereign
immunity--especially the function of immunity in preventing for-
eign policy disputes. This means that only federal law should govern
such questions; judicial interpretations of state long-arm statutes are
irrelevant to deciding claims of immunity. Once the court decides
that the foreign state is not immune, it must consider-as it does for
every defendant-whether asserting jurisdiction would violate no-
tions of minimum contacts and fair play. Here, too, a federal stan-
dard would control.
Separating immunity and personal jurisdiction concerns will not
always dictate different results in deciding whether personal jurisdic-
tion is proper. Indeed, none of the above discussion should be read
to indicate that the courts have been improperly denying or asserting
jurisdiction.1"' The point is that predictability and uniformity will
be vastly enhanced if the personal jurisdiction and immunity ques-
tions are separated and each is viewed from the proper perspective.
In each case it will be necessary to apply the statutory criteria for the
exceptions to immunity, and then to consider due process questions.
App ying International Shoe. A brief look at the minimum con-
tacts test as applied to some of the cases that have arisen should illus-
trate the way a proper personal jurisdiction analysis would proceed.
The International Shoe standard requires a nonresident defendant to
have had sufficient contacts with the forum so that the assertion of
jurisdiction "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice.' 102 The Supreme Court in World- Wide Volkswagen
explained that the minimum contacts portion of that test may be
satisfied only if the defendant's contact with the forum was such that
100. See, e.g., Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d
300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981).
101. In many instances the statutory exceptions to immunity authorize a much nar-
rower assertion of jurisdiction than would the more vague "fair play" criteria of International
Shoe. See Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981, 988 (N.D.
Ill. 1980) ("However, the . . .Act's bases of jurisdiction are 'less comprehensive than those
found in the usual jurisdictional statutes of the states and the District of Columbia.' ") (cita-
tion omitted); notes 107, 113 infra and accompanying texts; see also Verlinden B.V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), a 'don other grounds, 647 F.2d 320
(2d Cir. 1981).
102. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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the defendant reasonably could anticipate defending there.'0 3 In
suits against foreign governments, the relevant contacts are those
with the United States, not just those with the forum state."0 4 Thus,
a minimum contacts analysis typically would require some activity
by which the foreign state has purposefully availed itself of the privi-
leges and benefits of the laws of the United States.0 5 Fairness con-
cerns then require the court to balance numerous factors: the burden
on the defendant if jurisdiction is taken, the forum's interest in adju-
dicating the controversy, the plaintiffs interest in suing in the forum,
the availability of an alternate forum, whether judicial efficiency or
economy will result if jurisdiction is upheld, and whether any sub-
stantive policies will be fostered either by taking or by declining
jurisdiction.
10 6
One common situation for a lawsuit occurs when an American
supplier contracts to sell its product to a foreign government or one
of its agencies, and the buyer subsequently repudiates the contract or
fails to perform its obligations. Assuming that the defendant cannot
claim sovereign immunity because of the commercial nature of its
activities, 0 7 the issue is whether its contacts with the United States
were sufficient to meet the due process standard. To answer this
103. 444 U.S. at 297.
104. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
314 (2d Cir. 1981). In conventional private party litigation involving foreign defendants, one
must ask not only whether the defendant may be sued in the United States, but where
therein. In federal courts, FED. R. Civ. P. 4 serves as a geographic allocator by prescribing
where and how process may be delivered. In state courts, statutes or rules customarily con-
trol. Thus, if a foreign ship threads the St. Lawrence Seaway to Duluth, Minnesota, and
some activity there results in a claim of liability, courts in Minnesota might exercise personal
jurisdiction over the ship's owners because of the ship's connection with the forum, and pro-
cess might be served either inside or outside the state of Minnesota under either the Minne-
sota long-arm statute or under the method provided in Rule 4.
That the defendant owner is a sovereign state changes that result as to the form and
mechanics of service because of the Act's express provisions regulating notification of suit. See
28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976). But the Act is silent on whether the Minnesota courts, state or
federal, are the only permissible forums in the United States that can entertain the suit,
though the logical deduction is that all courts within the United States, rather than those of
any geographic locale, have jurisdiction to proceed. Considerations of the appropriate forum,
or the most convenient one, ought to be addressed on motions to transfer on those grounds,
rather than dismissing a suit in the District of Columbia or New York for lack of personal
jurisdiction-a course that might occur if the ship's owner were private rather than a govern-
ment. See text accompanying notes 127-42 infia.
105. This notion first appeared in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
106. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976). For an exploration of the extent of this exception to
sovereign immunity, see Kahale & Vega, supra note 2, at 236-44; Von Mehren, supra note 3,
at 48-54; Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 74 Am. J. INT'L
L. 640, 640-49 (1980); Note, supra note 3, at 550-52.
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question, the courts may consider who solicited the contract, where it
was entered into, and whether the defendant conducts any additional
commercial activity in the United States. t0 8 Jurisdiction probably
will not be upheld if the court finds that the contract on which the
suit is based is the only one which the foreign sovereign has in the
United States and that the American plaintiff solicited that agree-
ment. Minimum contacts are not established even if the plaintiff is
obliged to perform its obligations under the contract within United
States borders; the unilateral acts of the plaintiff do not show that the
defendant purposefully availed itself of the privileges and benefits of
United States law. 0 9
To finish its minimum contacts analysis, the court also must con-
sider the fairness of taking jurisdiction. "0 Notably, in any action in-
volving a foreign state defendant, it is likely that fairness concerns
will tip in favor of upholding jurisdiction."' There will be an enor-
mous interest in providing a United States forum for the settling of
the dispute when the plaintiff is an American citizen,' 2 since foreign
tribunals may not offer the plaintiff the same protection as a United
States court. In addition, the Act represents a substantive decision
by Congress concerning how to treat foreign governments in terms of
their immunity from liability. The assertion of jurisdiction in an ac-
tion properly brought under that statute, then, will further the policy
of the legislature to allow only restrictive immunity to be invoked.
Thus, as a practical matter, in most instances the major hurdle in
asserting personal jurisdiction will not be fairness, but the other crite-
108. For decisions finding sufficient contacts in contract cases, see, e.g., Gemini Ship-
ping, Inc. v. Foreign Trade Org. for Chems. & Foodstuffs, 647 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1981); Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
109. See, e.g., Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa
Rica, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980) (no minimum contacts when defendants never were pres-
ent or engaged in business in the state); Waukesha Engine Div., Dresser Americas, Inc. v.
Banco Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo, 485 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (that products
were made in the United States and defendant had once visited this country were not enough
for minimum contacts); cf. Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), afdper cwuam, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (no minimum contacts when foreign state
supplier avoided reach of United States law by selling only to Bahamian subsidiary of Ameri-
can buyer).
110. In the breach of contract actions cited in note 109supra, in which personal jurisdic-
tion was in issue, the courts declined jurisdiction on the ground that there were insufficient
minimum contacts and thus they did not go on to analyze the fairness portion of the
standard.
111. See, e.g., Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d
300, 315 (2d Cir. 1981).
112. When the plaintiff is not an American citizen, the court may, of course, dismiss on
forum non conveniens grounds. See text accompanying notes 127-42 infra.
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ria for determining whether sufficient minimum contacts can be
found.
Let us consider a case in which the foreign state, acting through
an agency or instrumentality, commits a tort within the United
States resulting in injury or death. 1 3 Traditional minimum contacts
analysis makes it clear that jurisdiction would be proper in this situa-
tion. The defendant by acting within the United States had reason
to foresee being sued there, at least with reference to those activities.
The suitability of jurisdiction is more difficult when the tort occurs
outside the United States, though the effects of the tort are felt within
the United States. 1 4  In this situation, the court must inquire
whether the defendant carries on other activity within the United
States by which it can be said to have purposefully entered into com-
merce here, as well as whether the tort, though not occurring within
the United States, arose in connection with its purposeful activity
here. In any case, the greater the connection with the United States,
the greater the possibility that foreseeability of suit will be found and
the minimum contacts standard met.'
5
3. Prejudgment attachment.
In a marked departure from the practice prior to 1976,"6 the Act
113. Foreign sovereigns cannot assert immunity when the state commits a tort within
the United States resulting in personal injury, death, or property damage. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(5) (1976). Certain torts carry immunity, however. Id § 1605(a)(5)(A)-(B). For a
fuller discussion of this exception to immunity, see Carl, supra note 65, at 1018-19.
114. See, e.g., Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981);In re
Rio Grande Transport, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Harris v. VAO Intourist,
Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v.
Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y.), a 'dmem., 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979); Upton v. Empire
of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), af'dmem., 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
115. Although the International Shoe standard may be satisfied so that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction would be constitutional, sovereign immunity may preclude some of these
actions. Absent a waiver, the only exception to immunity that might pertain to torts outside
the United States occurs when the court finds that the action was based on "a commercial
activity carried on in the United States" or an act outside the United States that was con-
nected with commercial activities of the foreign state and that caused a direct effect in the
United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976); see, e.g., Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 516
F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1061
(E.D.N.Y. 1979). The "direct effect" standard does not seem to be satisfied by the mere fact
that the injured person is an American citizen. See, e.g., id at 1065; Upton v. Empire of Iran,
459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C.), afdmem., 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Note, supra note 107, at
646-47.
116. Prior to 1976, courts had ruled that property owned by foreign sovereigns could be
attached for purposes of asserting jurisdiction over the sovereign, but property owned by
foreign governments was totally immune from execution. See Miller, supra note 69, at 126-27;
see also Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir.
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limits plaintiffs to actions in which they can obtain in personam juris-
diction over the foreign sovereign."t 7 The prejudgment seizure of
property for purposes of obtaining quasi in rem or in rem jurisdiction
over the defendant is unavailable."' 8 There are three rationales for
eliminating quasi in rem and in rem jurisdiction. First, it is no longer
necessary to allow additional types of personal jurisdiction, since the
Act greatly expands the plaintiff's ability to obtain in personamjuris-
diction over foreign sovereigns and provides a means of executing
judgments against them. t t9 Second, prejudgment attachments have
in the past caused considerable friction with foreign governments, so
it may be best to eliminate them except when the sovereign explicitly
consents. 120 Third, prejudgment attachments sometimes have in-
volved United States courts in litigation with foreign sovereigns con-
cerning activities that had few contacts with this country beyond the
1930) (government immunity to counterclaim waived by original suit); Weilamann v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 1088, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472 (Sup. Ct. 1959). The ra-
tionale for granting immunity from execution was, first, that the property-of most territorial
sovereigns was exempt from execution under local law and thus that foreign sovereigns should
not be less favored; and, second, to deny immunity might threaten peaceful international
relations. See Setser, The Immunities ofthe State and Government Activities, 24 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoBS. 291, 308 (1959). The result of this practice was that the prevailing litigant often
obtained a legally valid but wholly unenforceable judgment. The Act departs from this rule
by making the standards for granting immunity from execution conform more closely to those
governing jurisdictional immunity. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a)-(b), 1611 (1976). This change
was supported, in part, on the ground that there is a definite trend in international law to-
ward limiting execution immunity. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 27, reprinted in
[1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6626.
117. The Act authorizes subject matter jurisdiction only "as to any claim for relief in
personam." 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976). Further, at least one court has ruled that the Act's
prohibition of prejudgment attachment solely for jurisdictional purposes is so important that
quasi in rem jurisdiction is impermissible, see Geveke & Co. Int'l v. Kompania di Awa i
Elektrisidat di Korsou N.V., 482 F. Supp. 660, 663-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), even if subject matter
jurisdiction may be established outside of § 1330(a).
118. The Act allows prejudgment attachment of property owned by a foreign state only
when the state explicitly has waived its immunity from attachment and when the purpose of
the attachment is to secure the satisfaction of any judgment that ultimately may be entered.
28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1976). Even this exception is limited by the need to show an explicit,
not implicit, waiver. See, e.g., E-Systems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 491 F. Supp. 1294,
1300 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724,
728 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
119. See text accompanying notes 68-84 supra.
120. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 26-27, reprntedin [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEwS 6604, 6625-26. Although the loss of the power to obtain a prejudgment attach-
ment, particularly in admiralty cases, might have produced great controversy, no serious ob-
jections to that portion of the Act were raised; indeed, the position taken in the statute was
viewed as a reasonable compromise. See Note, supra note 3, at 556, 559-65.
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defendant's limited property interests.' 2 '
The elimination of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction presents a
particularly stark change in admiralty law, where suit traditionally
has been filed by arresting a vessel in port, thereby asserting in rem
jurisdiction. 122 In order to discourage the admiralty bar from contin-
uing to use this method of prejudgment seizure,' 23 Congress provided
that if the plaintiff improperly arrests a vessel for purposes of filing
suit and is not able to show that at the time he was unaware that the
vessel was owned by a foreign state rather than a private concern, the
required notice of the suit, whether actually received or not, "shall
not be deemed to have been delivered, nor may it thereafter be
delivered."'
124
It is important to note that the plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal
simply by pleading ignorance of the statutory requirements or the
defendant's sovereign capacity. 25 Thus, the penalty for improperly
or even negligently using a prejudgment attachment in admiralty is
121. HOUsE REPORT, supra note 18, at 26, reprintedin [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6604, 6625.
122. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§ 1-12, 9-3 to -4 (2d
ed. 1975).
123. The prohibition of prejudgment seizure of vessels of foreign states does not pre-
clude a court from ordering the defendant to post some form of security when it is required to
create an equality of security between the parties, rather than to obtain the release of its
vessel. See Willamette Transport, Inc. v. Cia. Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion, 491 F.
Supp. 442 (E.D. La. 1980).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b)(1) (1976). It is important to consider the potential effect of a
dismissal under this section. The Act simply states that the notice shall be treated as though
it never was delivered and that it may not be delivered subsequently so as to comply with the
statute. Thus, the plaintiff cannot merely file again in admiralty to enforce a maritime lien.
However, it is not clear whether the plaintiff is precluded from filing another claim against
the same foreign defendant if the other service provisions may be used and if the defendant
falls into one of the excepted categories to immunity listed in id. § 1605(a). This could occur,
for example, when the plaintiff in the first action had sought to have both admiralty and non-
admiralty claims decided. The statute and the legislative history are silent on this question.
Nonetheless, the strong desire of Congress to avoid the international friction caused by pre-
judgment seizures seems to argue that the plaintiff would be barred. See Velidor v. L/P/G
Benhgazi, 653 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding extenuating circumstances allowing a later in
personam claim, but clearly implying that the suit normally would be barred).
125. In Jet Line Services, Inc. v. M/V Marsa el Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md.
1978), the plaintiff brought an in rem action to recover for the cost of cleaning up after a
discharge of oil from the defendant's vessel. The president of the plaintiff corporation stated
that he had never known of the foreign state's ownership, and that he was not familiar with
the Act, and did not have in-house legal counsel. The defendant argued that the ship was
flying the Libyan flag and the government of Libya was listed as its owner in Lloyd's Ship-
ping Index. The court dismissed the suit, stating that "[t]o allow plaintiff to prevail despite
its self-proclaimed ignorance of the law would be to encourage a policy of 'attach first, ask
later,' and such an attitude would be in flagrant derogation of the policies behind the Immu-
nities Act." Id at 1176.
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severe. This makes even clearer the determination of Congress that
only in personam jurisdiction is available. 126
C. Venue and Forum Non Conveniens
The last question to consider when deciding where to file suit
against a foreign sovereign is venue. For actions filed in state court, a
plaintiff must consult the relevant state venue provisions. 127 For suits
filed in federal court, the Act provides that venue is proper where the
defendant does business or is licensed to do business,12 where the
vessel or cargo is located in admiralty actions, 129 or generally, where
the property that is the subject of the action is located or where the
claim for relief arose.
30
The Act has some special venue features worth noting. In an ac-
tion against the instrumentality of a foreign state, a plaintiff can es-
tablish venue easily, since the defendant may be located wherever it
does business or is licensed to do business. It is more difficult to de-
termine where a foreign state is present outside of its borders, how-
ever, so the Act allows for venue in the District of Columbia in
actions against foreign states.13' This choice recognizes that most for-
eign governments will have representatives in Washington, making it
convenient for them to defend an action there.
32
Another notable characteristic of the venue provisions is that a
plaintiff may file suit in any district where "a substantial part" of the
events or omissions underlying the claim for relief occurred, or where
126. One might note that although quasi in rem and in rem jurisdiction are improper in
any type of action under the Act, there is no comparable penalty for an improper prejudg-
ment attachment outside the admiralty field. The Act accords admiralty in rem cases special
treatment because there was a greater need to provide some enforcement mechanism to force
attorneys to abandon the traditional use of in rem jurisdiction in that field. Also, the poten-
tial for causing friction with foreign states is enormous in admiralty because attachment ties
up the ship, cargo, and crew, and so represents the power to immobilize assets worth millions,
irrespective of the amount of the claim involved.
127. Sometimes a search into state law will lead to nothing, because typical state venue
statutes provide for suit against a nonresident in any county or district. See F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.3 (2d ed. 1977). Foreign states can avoid this result by
removal to federal court, but may gain little thereby in terms of geography. Once in federal
court, however, a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) may produce greater
benefits.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(0(3) (1976).
129. Id § 1391(0(2).
130. Id § 1391(0(1).
131. Id § 1391(0(4).
132. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 32, reprinted in [1976 5 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6604, 6631.
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the property that is involved is located.133 This formulation signifi-
cantly expands the typical venue designation of "where the claim
arose" and recognizes that, as a practical matter, more than one dis-
trict may be convenient and appropriate for a suit involving complex
transactions.
One important unresolved question is whether a court may dis-
miss on grounds of forum non conveniens 34 an action brought by an
American plaintiff and in compliance with the venue provisions, if
the only alternate forum is in another country. 35 The answer re-
quires consideration of two issues. First, should the American citi-
zenship of the plaintiff be a compelling or presumptive factor against
dismissal? Second, does the governmental character of the defendant
suggest that dismissal should be precluded?
Certainly, the citizenship of the plaintiff does not alone justify
imposing increased burdens on a defendant trying to establish the
inconvenience of the plaintiff's chosen forum. 136 The courts' discre-
tion to grant forum non conveniens motions already is limited to "ex-
ceptional circumstances,"'' 37 and the court must engage in a careful
balancing of the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the fo-
rum in ruling on any such motion.' 38  But these concerns do not al-
133. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391l)(1) (1976).
134. Of course, if an action is filed in an improper venue, the defendant state may move
to dismiss, or more likely, to transfer the action to a proper district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406
(1976). But the Act does not afford the foreign state any special protection against the ordi-
nary waiver rules. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 32, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6631. Thus, as is true in actions against defendants other than
foreign states, the failure to make a timely objection to venue will act as a waiver of that
defense under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). See 5 C. WRIGHT &A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 1391.
135. The Supreme Court long has recognized that venue statutes merely establish a
presumption of convenience, and if the defendant can show the chosen forum is very incon-
venient, the court has discretion to dismiss the action. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501 (1947). A court may invoke this well-established power in suits against foreign sovereigns,
as there is nothing in the Act to suggest that Congress meant to eliminate judicial discretion
in this area. See Paterson, Zochonis (U.K.) Ltd. v. Compania United Arrow, S.A., 493 F.
Supp. 621, 625 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (suggesting that forum non conveniens motions may be
used in suits under the Act). Indeed, when alien plaintiffs sue foreign states in actions in
which the underlying transaction has little connection with the United States, the use of
forum non conveniens can eliminate burdensome litigation in which the United States has no
interest.
136. See Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 453 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afd,
654 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980); Note, Forum Non Con-
vemens and American Plaintif in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (1980).
137. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).
138. That balance may take into account the special burdens on an American plaintiff
forced to litigate in a foreign tribunal, including language barriers, distance, and unfamiliar-
ity with the foreign legal system. See Note, supra note 136, at 383.
January 1982]
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ways compel denial of dismissal as, for example, when the plaintiff is
an American corporation engaged in a continuous international busi-
ness and is fully capable of assuming the burdens of litigating in a
foreign forum. Thus, though a court may grant forum non con-
veniens motions less frequently when the only alternate forum is in a
foreign country, 39 it should not reject these motions without under-
taking a careful analysis of the facts as they relate to the actual con-
venience of those involved.
The fact that the defendant is a foreign government raises addi-
tional concerns that argue against dismissal. Prior to 1976, because
the State Department decided questions of sovereign immunity and
because no effective procedures governed suits against foreign gov-
ernments, an American plaintiff with a claim against a foreign gov-
ernment had no assurance that the suit would be allowed to go
forward. 140 One of the purposes of the Act was to provide American
plaintiffs access to their own courts to resolve these disputes.'
4 1
Given this policy, the presumption favoring a plaintiffs choice of an
American tribunal over a foreign one seems even stronger than in
other types of actions, especially when there is reason for concern
about the fairness or impartiality of litigating against a foreign state
in its own tribunals. This does not mean that the court never should
grant a forum non conveniens dismissal to a defending state, but it
does suggest that the standards for obtaining a dismissal may be
more rigidly applied against motions by foreign state defendants, and
that dismissal may be very infrequent.
142
II. PROCEDURES IN ACTIONS AGAINST A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
A. Special Procedures Afcting Foregn State Defendants
The Act alters only three of the procedural rules normally appli-
cable to civil actions in the federal courts. First, it gives foreign state
defendants 60 days to answer after service of process, instead of the
usual 20 day period for nongovernment defendants. 43 Second, it al-
lows judgment by default only if the plaintiff establishes the claim for
139. See, e.g., Aigner v. Bell Helicopters, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 532, 543 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
140. For a discussion of the practices prior to the Act, see note 3 supra.
141. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 30, at 24 (statement of Monroe Leigh).
142. Given that most of the statutory exceptions to immunity require the defendant
state to have some connection with the United States, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (1976), it is
unlikely that any litigation will have so little connection with the United States as to warrant
forum non conveniens dismissal.
143. See id. § 1608(d).
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relief "by evidence satisfactory to the court," instead of treating the
default as a concession of liability." Third, the Act appears to pro-
hibit jury trials in suits against foreign sovereigns.' 45 Except for these
provisions--each obviously designed to place foreign governments in
parity with our own federal government 146-- the Act allows the same
procedural rules to apply as those for ordinary lawsuits.147
But applying certain ordinary procedures may raise special
problems when foreign state defendants are present. For example,
when the foreign state is one of a number of defendants, both the
requirements of Rule 13(g) and sovereign immunity limit the ability
of co-defendants to file cross-claims against the foreign state., 48 It
also should be necessary to follow the Act's service provisions for
cross-claims as well as for original actions, since the policy of assuring
notice to foreign states by setting forth detailed and binding service
rules requires that they be applied to any claim filed against the for-
eign state.
149
Similarly, the operation of discovery against foreign state defend-
ants may cause special problems, particularly if the information or
documents that the plaintiff seeks are not present in the United
States.' The lessons learned in suits against private defendants
when discovery must be carried on in a foreign country should apply
here, "'51 though special governmental privileges, such as a privilege to
144. Id § 1608(e).
145. See notes 187-201 infra and accompanying text.
146. The United States government has 60 days to answer, see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a),
default judgments against it may be entered only when the plaintiff establishes the claim "by
evidence satisfactory to the court," see FED. R. Civ. P. 55(e), and there is no right to a jury
trial in actions brought against the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976).
147. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will govern actions filed in federal court,
while the relevant state procedural rules control actions filed in state court. State courts need
not apply the federal rules even though the action involves a foreign state and thus, at least
arguably, a strong federal interest. Congress recognized that allowing suits to be filed in the
state courts might result in some disparate treatment of foreign state defendants, but rather
than providing for uniform procedures to govern all these actions, it made such procedures
available at the option of the defendant through an unlimited right of removal. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(d) (1976).
148. See id. §§ 1604-1606 (sovereign immunity); FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) (limiting cross-
claims to claims against co-parties arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the
original action or any counterclaim therein or relating to property that is the subject matter
of the original action).
149. See notes 68-84 supra and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); see alro Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovegy
Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YA.E LJ. 612 (1979).
151. Discovery in foreign countries frequently depends upon cooperation between the
officials of the country whose court is seeking discovery and those of the country where the
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prevent disclosure of state secrets, may preclude discovery of infor-
mation that could be obtained from a private defendant.'52
Two issues deserve further consideration: first, the rules that
should govern the interjection and proof of sovereign immunity; and
second, the possibility of a jury trial in an action against a foreign
state. The remainder of this article explores these issues.
B. Raising and Proving Sovereign Immuniy
The procedural treatment of sovereign immunity has been a
problem since suits were first brought against governmental entities.
The confusion stems from the fact that immunity issues seem to bear
on jurisdictional concerns or, at least, are expressed in jurisdictional
terms-that is, whether a court has the power to adjudicate matters
involving the sovereign. At the same time, sovereign immunity as a
concept derives from the need to protect governments from bother-
some-if not potentially ruinous-lawsuits, as well as from notions of
international comity and respect for the power and dignity of the
government. 153 Thus, immunity is also a defense that may be waived
if the sovereign does not desire to invoke that protection.
In American law, the choice whether to treat the sovereign im-
munity question as a jurisdictional prerequisite or as an affirmative
defense is important because it controls the rules prescribing how,
when, and by whom the issue can be raised. Courts may answer
questions such as who bears the burden of pleading and proving sov-
ereign immunity, or whether failure to raise the issue in a timely
fashion waives immunity, or whether a defendant may collaterally
attack a judgment on the ground of sovereign immunity, only when
they have decided whether immunity is a matter of jurisdiction or is
an affirmative defense. Fortunately, the Act provides some guidance
in characterizing sovereign immunity, though it is neither completely
clear nor comprehensive in addressing this problem.
The Act does not explicitly deal with the pleading and proof of
sovereign immunity. Indeed, it seems to contain conflicting signals.
On the one hand, the provision authorizing federal court subject
matter jurisdiction in actions against foreign sovereigns rests the
discovery is to take place. Parties must consult various specialized rules and procedures re-
garding such cooperation. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 2083; Miller,
International Cooperation in Litigation Between the United States and Switzerland- Unilateral Procedural
Accommodation in a Test Tube, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1069 (1965); Smit, International Litigation Under
the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1015 (1965).
152. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 2019.
153. See, e.g., National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362 (1955).
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court's jurisdiction on a finding that the defendant is not entitled to
immunity.' This suggests that immunity is jurisdictional and the
plaintiff thus would assume the burdens of pleading and proving the
jurisdictional prerequisite in keeping with traditional rules. 155 On
the other hand, the Act sets forth sovereign immunity as a basic prin-
ciple allowing exceptions only in specified cases. I1 6 This reflects the
evolution of sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense, a legacy
Congress has acknowledged.
157
In practice, most courts have followed the latter approach and
treated immunity as a defense, placing the burden of pleading and
proving immunity on the defendant state. 15' But given the Act's
conflicting characterizations of the issue, it is not surprising that no
consistent procedure for raising immunity has evolved and that liti-
gants are uncertain about the proper method for introducing a sover-
eign immunity question.
159
Similar confusion exists in allocating the burden of proof between
the litigants. Insofar as immunity is treated as an affirmative de-
fense, the ultimate burden of proving that any defendant state's ac-
tivities are immune should rest on that state. However, the
legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress envisioned a
more complex scheme in which the foreign state merely has the bur-
den to produce prima facie evidence of immunity. According to this
scheme, the plaintiff must show that the state's activities fall into one
of the statutory exceptions to immunity, and the state retains the
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
155. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 23, § 69.
156. Set 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605 (1976).
157. According to the House Report,
[s]tating the basic principle in terms of immunity may be of some advantage to
foreign states in doubtful cases, but, since sovereign immunity is an affirmative de-
fense which must be specially pleaded, the burden will remain on the foreign state
to produce evidence in support of its claim of immunity.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 17, repinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs
6604, 6616.
158. See, e.g., Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1378 (5th Cir.
1980); Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 389 n.16 (D.N.J.
1979).
159. See Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980) (motion for sum-
mary judgment on immunity grounds); Waukesha Engine Div., Dresser Americas, Inc. v.
Banco Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo, 485 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (letters pro-
testing jurisdiction sent to foreign court which had participated in service of process); Perez v.
The Bahamas, 482 F. Supp. 1208 (D.D.C. 1980) (motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter
and personal jurisdiction on grounds of immunity); Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air
Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 389-90 (D.N.J. 1979) (immunity raised sua sponte).
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ultimate burden of proving immunity. 60 How these rather artificial
shifting burdens will operate is yet to be seen.
The persistent attempts by the courts and the legislature to force
sovereign immunity into traditional molds has caused much of the
procedural confusion surrounding the issue by obscuring what
should be the central inquiry: how to develop procedures for raising
and proving immunity that take into account the special concerns
surrounding the doctrine. Moreover, applying our familiar ap-
proaches automatically to questions of sovereign immunity overlooks
that these approaches are not necessarily traditional outside the
United States,' 6 ' and that courts should take care to establish proce-
dures that defendants not familiar with our traditions can
understand.
1. Raising questions of sovereign immunity. who, when, and how.
This inquiry focuses on three related issues. First, who should
bear the burden of interjecting the issue of sovereign immunity into
the proceeding? 62 Second, what timing restrictions should be placed
on the right to raise a sovereign immunity question before inactivity
will act as a waiver of immunity? Finally, what are the procedures
for introducing the immunity issue into the action?
The answer to the first question seems relatively clear. Since the
principal purpose of immunity is to protect the interests of the for-
eign state, the state should bear the burden of asserting the doctrine
if it desires that protection. 63 A court is under no obligation to in-
vestigate questions of immunity on its own motion and indeed, in
fairness to the plaintiff, should not do so. Although these conclusions
are incompatible with the characterization of immunity as a jurisdic-
tional requirement, they are nonetheless consistent with the general
approach to immunity taken in the Act, which recognizes that states
160. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 17, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6604, 6616.
161. For example, rigid pleading rules and waiver results are anomalous to lawyers and
judges trained in civil law systems. See, e.g., Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German
Civil Procedure I, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1212-13 (1958).
162. The burden of interjecting a sovereign immunity question into an action should be
distinguished from the burden of proving immunity, which may raise other policy considera-
tions. See notes 180-86 inra and accompanying text.
163. The legislative history of the Act suggests this conclusion, although there it is
phrased in terms of whether immunity is an affirmative defense that the state must plead. See
note 157 supra. Moreover, the notion that a party for whom a special protection is provided
in the law has the obligation of invoking that protection or losing it is common throughout
American procedure. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 127, § 12.22.
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are not absolutely immune from suit. Given that states legitimately
can be sued for certain activities, it is appropriate to place on them
the burden of asserting that the activity under the court's considera-
tion is in the category remaining immune.
It is more difficult to ascertain the stage of the proceedings at
which the defendant foreign state loses the right to claim immunity.
Since immunity concerns revolve around issues unrelated to the mer-
its of the dispute and require dismissal when properly invoked, judi-
cial economy and common sense argue that the defendant should
raise immunity early in the proceedings. The Act specifically recog-
nizes that a foreign state may waive its immunity "either explicitly or
by implication;"164 moreover, Congress contemplated that an implied
waiver would arise from failure to raise immunity in the responsive
pleading.1 65 Thus, if a foreign state defendant does not raise the im-
munity issue at some early stage-for example, before the pleadings
are closed-then it may be appropriate for the court to rule that the
defendant has by its inactivity impliedly waived its right to claim
immunity. 66
The Act is silent on the question of how to raise immunity. The
general approach to the treatment of preliminary issues not involving
the merits is to allow, or in some instances to require, that parties
raise them in the answer, or in pretrial motions to dismiss or for sum-
mary judgment, or by way of special appearances for the purpose of
addressing the issue. Because of the central importance of sovereign
immunity, the focus should not be on requiring compliance with
specified procedural devices for raising the issue, thereby setting traps
for litigants unfamiliar with our judicial system.1 67 As long as the
court makes an early determination of immunity, judicial economy
concerns will be satisfied.1 68 The sole question, therefore, is one of
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(i) (1976) (emphasis added).
165. See HOUSE REPORT, subra note 18, at 18, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6604, 6617.
166. See In re Rio Grande Transport, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(filing of conditional counterclaim does not act as implied waiver); Castro v. Saudi Arabia,
510 F. Supp. 309, 311-12 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (failure to answer is not implied waiver).
167. For an example of a straightforward, nontechnical approach to this problem, see
European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, art. 3, Europ. T.S. No. 74 ("I. A
Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another Con-
tracting State if, before claiming immunity, it takes any step in the proceedings relating to the
merits. However, if the State satisfies the court that it could not have acquired knowledge of
facts on which a claim to immunity can be based until after it has taken such a step, it can
claim immunity based on these facts if it does so at the earliest possible moment.").
168. Thus, it should not matter in a federal court action whether the foreign state in-
troduces immunity by way of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, FED. R. Civ. P.
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timeliness.'69
As a matter of policy, this flexible approach to the procedures for
interjecting immunity is not only justified, but compelled. Nonethe-
less, it does alter some of the familiar rules governing preliminary
determinations of other issues. For example, in the federal courts, the
application of Rule 12(g) requires the consolidation of all pretrial
motions to dismiss. 170 If this rule were applied, a foreign state might
waive sovereign immunity if it previously had raised some other pre-
liminary defense such as insufficient service of process.1
7 1
Procedures of this type should not apply to sovereign immunity.
The imposition of technical restrictions on the ability of a foreign
state to claim sovereign immunity could create needless international
friction. Foreign government defendants should not lose the right to
immunity merely because of an inadvertent misunderstanding of lo-
cal court practices. That Congress recognized the possibility of an
implied waiver merely reflects an understanding that a state may by
its action or inaction convey a lack of interest in raising immunity. It
does not suggest what procedures should be used in connection with
the assertion of the issue.
The final question concerning how to raise sovereign immunity is
whether a foreign sovereign may successfully assert immunity as a
means of collaterally attacking a judgment. The answer depends, at
least in part, on where the collateral attack is made. If the judgment
holder seeks to enforce the judgment outside the United States, and
especially in the courts of the foreign state defendant, different results
12(b)(1), a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief, FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or
a motion for summary judgment, FED. R. Civ. P. 56. Indeed, it is worth noting that the
courts that have addressed sovereign immunity claims under the Act have not appeared to be
concerned about what procedural device was used for raising the issue. Litigants have used a
range of methods and, appropriately, the focus has been on the substance of the claim itself,
not the form in which it was raised. See cases cited in note 159 supra.
169. The early resolution of sovereign immunity questions may not always be possible
as, for example, when resolution would require a serious inquiry into the merits. In that
event, immunity may be postponed. The major countervailing consideration is whether the
delay in raising the issue has unduly prejudiced the plaintiff.
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(g); see 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, §§ 1384-1389.
171. State systems using special appearances as the means of raising jurisdiction ques-
tions often provide that the defendant must put forward that objection as the first act taken in
the action and cannot join other defenses for preliminary consideration at the same time or
waiver will occur. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13, comment b (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1978); Thode, In Personamjurirdiction; Article 20313, The Texas "Long Am"Juridic-
lion Statute; And the Appearance to ChallengeJurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEX. L. REV.
279 (1964). Applying these rules, the failure to raise sovereign immunity at the outset and
alone could be deemed an implicit waiver.
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may obtain than if the enforcement proceeding were to take place in
the United States.
Within this country, constitutional and statutory requirements
provide that judgments rendered in one court system which are en-
forced in another judicial system must be given the same faith and
credit to which they would be entitled in the state rendering judg-
ment.' 72 The only exceptions to this rule involve objections to de-
fault judgments, because of the general preference for decisions on
the merits.1 73 Otherwise, once the defendant has appeared in one
court system and litigated there, judicial economy demands that any
judgment that is entered be final and binding174
Applying this approach to sovereign immunity, a foreign state
should be successful in collaterally attacking a United States judg-
ment on sovereign immunity grounds only when a default judgment
is involved.1 75 Immunity, like jurisdiction, presents an important is-
sue that courts should not foreclose without some scrutiny. But if the
state raised the issue in the first court and lost, there is no reason to
relitigate the question. And if the state litigated the merits of the
action, but failed to raise its immunity claim, its interjection of the
issue on collateral attack would be untimely and could prejudice the
judgment winner severely; in that situation, the court should rule
that the defendant impliedly waived its right to claim immunity by
its conduct in the first proceeding. 7 '
International enforcement of judgments against foreign sover-
eigns is harder to predict. Enforcement is a matter of comity, not a
product of constitutional compulsion.1 77 Thus, in deciding whether
172. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
173. See Schwab v. Bullock's, Inc., 508 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
174. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's
Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
175. There is authority authorizing the United States to make a collateral attack on a
judgment entered after a full trial on the merits on grounds of sovereign immunity. See
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940). Because the Act is
designed to provide similar treatment for foreign governments and the United States, one
could argue that the Act permits foreign governments to make a collateral attack even when a
default judgment is not involved. But this argument is ill-conceived. The rationale support-
ing the right of the United States to attack the judgment was that a single attorney from the
Justice Department had no authority to acquiesce in a suit on behalf of the government. In
actions under the Act, foreign government officials with greater authority will be apprised of
the action because of the Act's service requirements, see notes 68-84 supra and accompanying
text, and it is not unreasonable to interpret the defendant's failure to raise immunity at any
stage in the first proceeding as a conscious decision to waive it.
176. See notes 164-66 supra and accompanying text.
177. See A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 63, § 46; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
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to enforce an American judgment, a foreign court may take into ac-
count the differences between the two legal systems and whether it
would violate the foreign court's public policy to enforce the judg-
ment. 78 In that case, a collateral attack on immunity grounds that
would fail in the United States might be successful elsewhere.
179
In summary, the underlying policies of the Act, coupled with the
apparent intent of Congress, suggest that the foreign state must bear
the burden of raising any sovereign immunity claims and must dis-
charge that burden at an early stage in the proceeding-preferably
before or in the responsive pleading. Further, courts should not ap-
ply technical rules of pleading or pretrial motions to avoid consider-
ing the immunity issue on its merits. It should not matter what
procedure the defendant uses to interject immunity into the action as
long as the introduction of the issue is timely and whatever delay has
occurred does not prejudice the opposing party. In keeping with this
flexible approach, a foreign state defendant may attack a default
judgment on grounds of sovereign immunity, but may not make a
collateral attack in United States courts after a trial on the merits.
2. Proving soveregn immunity.
Congress apparently conceived of the proof of sovereign immu-
nity as a process of shifting burdens between the parties. 180 But an
analysis of the Act and its legislative history merely identifies who
bears these burdens; it does not explain how parties may satisfy them.
Although the Act's shifting of the burden of proof may seem awk-
ward or complex, there is much to commend it. Establishing immu-
nity most often will depend on a factual inquiry, and the facts
necessary to meet the standard are most easily accessible to, if not
OF LAWS § 98 (1971); see also Schibsby v. Westenholz, [1870] 6 Q.B. 155 (refusing to enforce in
an English court the judgment of a foreign court that did not have proper jurisdiction over
the defendant).
178. Although the principle of restrictive sovereign immunity is commonly applied by
other countries, the Act's characterization of the situations which fall within that principle is
not recognized as widely. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (REVISED) § 451, at 179 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981); see also State Immunity Act, 1978,
c. 33, §§ 1-11, reprinted in 17 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1123 (1978); European
Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, art. 1-15, Europ. T.S. No. 74. Thus, to the
extent that these standards are markedly different from those of the United States, public
policy may be invoked to avoid the judgment on the ground that it violates the concept of
immunity adhered to in the enforcement forum.
179. In the United States, arguments of public policy will not succeed in avoiding the
full faith and credit requirement. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); note 172 supra
and accompanying text.
180. See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
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within the exclusive control of, the foreign state.""8 Further, since the
question arises at a preliminary stage of the litigation, there need not
be a full evidentiary hearing; affidavits of foreign state officials
should suffice. 182
Once the defendant shows that it fits within the category of im-
mune government entities, the court must determine whether it has
engaged in the type of activity that deprives it of immunity, or has
waived its right to claim immunity.'13 This inquiry usually will de-
pend on the plaintiff's substantive claim for relief. For example, a
court will find an exception to immunity if the plaintiff claims a right
to relief because the defendant took its property in violation of inter-
national law. 84 Thus, the plaintiff should bear the burden of estab-
lishing that an aspect of the defendant's conduct requires an
exception to immunity. This burden is not an onerous one; plaintiff's
allegations of facts supporting the invocation of a given exception
should meet it."8 5
But to the extent that an exception to immunity depends on a
more detailed inquiry, the burden of demonstrating that the excep-
tion does not apply should be on the defendant, who has access to the
facts. Meeting this burden requires the defendant to present evi-
dence supporting its version of the facts.'8 6 In this way, the party
best able to provide the information necessary for the court to evalu-
ate the question of sovereign immunity bears the burden of doing so.
This is a proven and useful guide for allocation and carries here the
additional imprimatur of congressional sanction.
C. Right toJug, Trial
Section 1330 limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
181. For example, if the defendant is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, it
may claim immunity only if (1) it is a separate legal person, (2) it is an organ of a foreign
state or the state maintains a major or controlling ownership interest in the entity, and (3) it
is not otherwise a citizen of the United States or created under the laws of any third country.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1976). If the defendant, though controlled by a foreign state, is
incorporated under the laws of one of the fifty states, it is to be treated like any other Ameri-
can corporation and may not claim the special benefits and protections of a foreign state. See
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 15, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs
6604, 6614.
182. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980).
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976).
184. See id § 1605(a)(3).
185. Cf. Jet Line Services, Inc. v. M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1171-72
(D. Md. 1978) (placing initial burden of coming forward on defendant in attachment action).
186. See, e.g., Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 396, 407-08
(D.N.J. 1979).
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courts in suits brought under the Act to nonjury cases, t8 7 treating
these actions similarly to actions brought against the United
States.188 This provision raises two related questions. The first is
whether a plaintiff may demand a jury trial when subject matter ju-
risdiction is founded in statutes other than the Act.'89 The second is
whether a legislative policy against jury trials can be enforced con-
sistently with the seventh amendment. t g
The first question must be answered in the negative: The Act's
stand against jury trials should preclude jury trials in all actions
against foreign governments. A variety of arguments have been
made against this conclusion. 9' One is that the language that for-
bids jury trial is present only in the jurisdictional section of the
Act, 192 not in the sections substantively defining sovereign immunity
that would apply to actions brought under any source of jurisdiction.
This should be considered as a legislative oversight, however-one
that resulted from the Act's pervasive confusion of procedural and
substantive requirements. Although Congress did not consider fully
the constitutional ramifications of its nonjury policy, it is quite clear
that it did consider the advantages and disadvantages of jury trials
and favored abolishing them. A strong concern was expressed that
uniformity in decisions should be fostered in suits against foreign
187. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d) (1976).
188. Id § 2402. That there is no right to a jury trial in actions brought against the
United States was recently reaffirmed in Lehman v. Nakshian, 101 S. Ct. 2698 (1981).
189. As, for example, when jurisdiction may be claimed on the basis of diversity of
citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). For a discussion of whether a court may base sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in an action against a foreign sovereign on a statute other than the
Act, see notes 39-47 supra and accompanying text.
190. Some courts have treated jury trial demands by asking whether Congress intended
the Act's subject matter provisions to be the exclusive means of obtaining federal subject
matter jurisdiction in suits against foreign sovereigns. See, e.g., Williams v. Shipping Corp. of
India, 489 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1980), aj'd, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981); Lonon v. Com-
panhia de Navegacao Lloyd Basileiro, 85 F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1979). But this approach con-
fuses jurisdiction with jury trial concerns and fails to consider important policy and
constitutional issues. See notes 193-94 infra and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(arguing that since Congress allows actions to be filed in state court, plaintiffs will bring
actions outside of the federal court system to avoid the jury prohibition). But this argument
fails to recognize that if Congress intended to bar jury trials in actions against foreign sover-
eigns, then state courts would be obliged to honor that decision in actions filed there. Cf Dice
v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (statutory provision for jury trial not "local rule
of court," hence binding on state courts). In general, courts have refused to be bound by the
Act's legislative history and have noted that the Act on its face does not require such a broad
construction. See, e.g., Lonon v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Basileiro, 85 F.R.D. 71
(E.D. Pa. 1979); Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D.D.C. 1979).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
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governments and that uniformity could be achieved best by judge
trials. 193 Moreover, suits against foreign sovereigns, with all their po-
tential for creating international friction, may require that some pro-
tections be afforded to avoid at least the needless friction that might
arise because of a perceived aberrant verdict rendered by a jury.
194
The seventh amendment issue is less complicated. The Supreme
Court has held that the Constitution guarantees a civil jury trial
whenever the nature of the relief sought is such that it would have
warranted a jury trial if brought at common law.1 95 But jury trial
was not available at common law in any suit against a foreign sover-
eign because immunity precluded any action from being brought.
96
Without a common law analogue to the modern action under the
Act, the seventh amendment should not preserve the jury trial rights
of modern-day plaintiffs suing governmental entities: One cannot
preserve what never existed.1
97
193. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 13, reprinted in [ 1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6604, 6611-12. Allowing a jury trial simply because the plaintiff is able to claim
jurisdiction under some additional statute could seriously undercut that decision. As Judge
Friendly argued in Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639
F.2d 872, 876 (2d Cir. 1981), "The courts must learn to accept that, in place of the familiar
dichotomy of federal question and diversity jurisdiction, the Immunities Act has created a
tripartite division-federal question cases, diversity cases and actions against foreign states. If
a case falls within the third division, there is to be no jury trial even if it might also come
within one of the other two." See also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (REviSED) § 457, at 212 (rent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
Even though the Act precludes jury trials in suits against foreign sovereigns, ajury trial is
still permissible for related claims against any private, nongovernmental defendants that are
joined in the suit. In such cases the judge may determine the facts concerning the state, and
the jury concerning the other defendants. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F.
Supp. 384, 396 (D. Del. 1978). But cf. Goar v. Companhia Peruana de Vapores, 510 F. Supp.
737 (E.D. La. 1981) (denying any jury trial in action against foreign sovereign vessel owner
and domestic insurer due to possible conflict between factfinders).
194. That foreign governments are subject to jury trial when they sue as plaintiffs in
United States courts proves nothing to the contrary, for so is the United States itself when
suing in a proprietary capacity, such as in an action for trespass on government-owned lands
when title is involved. See United States v. Williams, 441 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1971). Moreover,
the state, by filing suit and thereby invoking the protection of the American courts, must
submit itself to all the procedural trappings of American court litigation. It can claim no
right to special treatment. Thus, while it is perfectly legitimate to construe a statute to avoid
constitutional problems, in this instance the nonjury trial policy seems clear.
195. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974).
196. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388 (1943); McElrath v. United
States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880).
197. Some litigants have argued that suits brought under the Act represent situations in
which the United States has decided to authorize suits against foreign governments, regard-
less of their consent, and thus the right to jury trial should be tested by the underlying claim
for relief, not by the character of the parties. See Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F.
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The principal argument against this conclusion involves suits
against the agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states, rather than
the states themselves. Historically, the concept of foreign sovereign
immunity was a limited one because government activities were lim-
ited in scope. Only within modern times have governments dele-
gated authority to numerous agencies with independent powers to
act, or controlled major portions of their nations' economies. Con-
gress took these changes into account in the Act and defined "foreign
state" to include many of these entities. ' 98 Thus, it is arguable that
modern governmental agencies that do not fit within the traditional
concept of a foreign state should be treated as private parties for jury
trial purposes.' 99 Then, if the underlying claim were legal rather
than equitable, the plaintiff would be able to assert a legitimate sev-
enth amendment right to a jury trial, regardless of the intent of
Congress.
But this argument does not adequately recognize the power of
Congress to create statutory causes of action. In other areas in which
the courts have ruled that a jury trial was required, Congress had
been silent on the question, so that a court could find no basis for a
legislative decision that a jury trial would be inadequate or dysfunc-
tional.2 0 But when, as here, there is no historical counterpart to a
particular action, and when Congress has clearly expressed a prefer-
ence against jury trials that is a legitimate policy decision, the sev-
enth amendment does not mandate otherwise.2'
Supp. 459, 465 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Although some seventh amendment decisions appear to
expand the constitutional jury trial guarantee to whenever the underlying nature of the issue
to be resolved is legal in character, these rulings should not be read too broadly. In each case,
the Court considered either whether Congress could create a statutory action simply by indi-
cating a preference for nonjury trial, or whether the availability of modern procedural devices
would allow a jury trial when historically comparable actions were tried in equity. See Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). In no case did the Court rule on an action
that could not be brought in the common law courts regardless of the procedures available.
See Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981); Ruggiero v. Compania
Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1981); see also
Kane, CivilJuy Tal: The Casefor Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 12 (1976).
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1976).
199. See Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459, 466 n.6 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
200. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974).
201. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442 (1977). Congress's treatment of instrumentalities of the United States government pro-
vides further support for the conclusion that the seventh amendment does not mandate ajury
trial in actions against the instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns. No doubt much of the
[Vol. 34:385
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III. CONCLUSION
The ambiguous drafting of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
has led to numerous inconsistencies and conflicts among the courts in
recent decisions. This article has considered, in sequence, the most
important procedural issues a prospective plaintiff under the Act
will encounter.
Many of these problems result from the confusing mixture of pro-
cedural and substantive matters in the structure of the Act. The rec-
ognition of these concerns, combined with a sensitivity to the
purposes of the Act and its intended interaction with other laws, pro-
vides an analytical approach that can help to resolve the problems
the Act presents. This article has demonstrated how that approach
can be applied to develop a consistent and fair interpretation of the
Act's provisions. This analysis ultimately will provide plaintiffs and
defendants with a predictable legal structure to be applied in all ac-
tions against foreign sovereigns.
impetus for the Act came from concern about the state "instrumentalities" that perform func-
tions which in this nation are carried on by private enterprises enjoying no sovereign immu-
nity. In the United States, Congress waived any immunity that government instrumentalities
engaged in commercial activity, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Commodity
Credit Corporation, might have enjoyed, by including standard sue-and-suability clauses in
their charters. See 16 U.S.C. § 831c(b) (1976) (Tennessee Valley Authority); 15 U.S.C.
§ 714b(c) (1976) (Commodity Credit Corporation). The TVA charter is silent on jury trial,
and the Commodity Credit Corporation charter precludes jury trial in suits "against" the
corporation. Id In practice, no jury trial is allowed, regardless of the nature of the underly-
ing claim for relief, unless the federal government sues in the guise of its controlled instrumen-
tality. See Cargill, Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 275 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1960); see also
United States ex ret. TVA v. Undivided One-Seventh Fee Simple Interest in a Tract of Land
Containing 0.43 Acre, More or Less, in Franklin County, Tennessee, 304 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D.
Tenn. 1969). Admittedly, many foreign nations are more disposed than we are to employ
instrumentalities. Nonetheless, the Act is at least consistent in treating foreign government
instrumentalities the same as domestic ones.
January 1982]
HeinOnline -- 34 Stan. L. Rev. 425 1981-1982
HeinOnline -- 34 Stan. L. Rev. 426 1981-1982
